Gamelin

In “Our Own Worst Enemy” (Jonathan Cape 1987) Norman Dixon describes the fall of France between May 10 and June 22 1940. In particular he assesses General Maurice Gamelin.

Having passed first out of St Cyr in 1891, Gamelin rose quietly through the ranks, non–aggressive, “a lifetime of avoiding trouble”. In the build–up to the German attack, he refused to accept the evidence of the German preparations. This included airforce reports of a 60 mile column of enemy tanks moving through the Ardennes, and a forecast of the precise date of the German attack. Gamelin refused to recall men on leave – in case it affected morale! He split his command rather than focus it, made no effort to install strong communication lines, and would not confront the need to co–ordinate all three services to ensure a complete response to Hitler’s attack. Though Supreme Commander, he sought no influence over the air force or the navy, in contrast to Montgomery’s decisive co–ordinating control at El Alamein. Instead he almost literally “buried his head in his own headquarters, where he lay submerged like a submarine without a periscope” in paperwork and discussion. Norman Dixon describes the reaction as stemming not from excessive confidence, an arrogant, if erroneous, disdain for the enemy, so much as from “a lack of confidence. In this case the lower the confidence, and larger the real threat, the more necessary would it be to avoid unpleasant facts that might shatter peace of mind”.

Gamelin’s story carries examples that contradict most, if not all, of the six characteristics of leadership – no unshakeable vision, no eloquent communications, no confronting reality, no visibility or creation of a core team. Instead signs of silent, lonely despair. These matter. You can see them across offices throughout the country – Managers looking small, still, silent and solitary.

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