Military Blunders and Arnhem

There are several highly readable accounts of military incompetence all well worth study for themselves and for their self-evident parallels with business today. Leading them all is Norman Dixon's "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" (Pimlico, Random House, London 1994). Originally published in 1976, Norman Dixon's book, more than any other, set me on my passion for psychology, coaching and helping people. His books are a must–read for all managers. I have quoted his summary of the issues at Arnhem and of Montgomery's actions:

The failure of the operation resulted from a concatenation of the following factors:

As a result of his neglect to open up the port of Antwerp by clearing the Schelde estuary, Montgomery allowed the German 15th Army to escape into north Holland, where it was available to defend the approaches to Arnhem.
The arrival at Arnhem of XXX Corps depended upon them advancing across 64 miles of enemy-held territory on a one-tank front, along elevated, unprotected highways, flanked by a soft and sodden tank–proof landscape, interspersed with waterways. Any delay – a blown bridge, an enemy ambush, a blocked road – and the entire column would be stopped. Any delay, and the Germans would have more time to bring up reinforcements. In the event it is hardly surprising that XXX Corps never did reach Arnhem &ndash that they could not achieve even in nine days what had been scheduled to take 48 hours.
As might have been expected from what is known of English autumns, the mists, if not the mellow fruitfulness, of an English late September delayed the departure of subsequent gliders and paratroops for the reinforcement of First Airborne Division.
"Market&ndashGarden", perhaps more than most military operations, necessitated good communications between the various units and commanders of the attacking force. But here technology failed them. Though it was now fifty years since Marconi had succeeded in sending messages by wireless, the radio sets carried by the invasion force proved useless. Unless within earshot of each other, no one knew what anyone else was doing.
Since the airborne assault was to take place in daylight, and because it was vital that the XXX Corps should complete their journey within 48 hours, the whole enterprise depended upon an absence of strong German forces both in the Arnhem area and on the approach route from the south.

Hence it came as something of a jolt when SHAEF received reports from the Dutch underground that two SS Panzer divisions which had mysteriously "disappeared" some time previously had now reappeared almost alongside the dropping zone.

This information, passed on to Montgomery, received support from British aerial photography of German tanks in the Arnhem area. Meanwhile forward troops of British Second Army reported a build-up of German forces along their intended line of advance.

This was the moment to reassess the risks involved. But since these ugly facts did not accord with what had been planned, they fell upon a succession of deaf ears. Taking a lead from Montgomery, who had described the SHAEF report as ridiculous, British Second Army Headquarters were quick to discount it also. When one of his intelligence officers showed him the aerial photographs of German armour, General Browning, at First British Airborne HQ, retorted: "I wouldn't trouble myself about these if I were you &ndash they″re probably not serviceable at any rate." The Intelligence Officer was then visited by the Corps Intelligence Officer, a British Lieutenant–Colonel, decided there was no direct evidence that the Arnhem area contained "much more than the considerable flak defences already known to exist." As Ryan puts it: "Throughout all the Allied line of command the evaluation of intelligence on the Panzers in the Arnhem area was magnificently bungled."

Finally, just in case there were any residual doubts, the intelligence staff of Second Army came up with the reassuring opinion that any German forces in the Arnhem area were "weak, demoralised, and likely to collapse entirely if confronted with a large airborne attack." "Market–Garden" went ahead &ndash but not quite as planned. Instead of encountering a few old men who collapsed or ran away, First Airborne Division fell upon a hornets″ nest of German armour. Far from being demoralised, the enemy fought like tigers to defend the gateway to their homeland. And far from sweeping across Holland to aid the hard–pressed paratroops, the tanks of Second Army's XXX Corps were reduced to a crawl by the combination of unsuitable terrain and a determined opposition.

Military Blunders and Arnhem

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