Challenger

The Challenger Spacecraft disaster in the US in the mid 1980″s shocked a nation that believed and supported the can–do mentality of the NASA space programme.

The accident was occasioned by a defective rubber seal. It was caused by the culture of the NASA organisation , and the dismissal ,by its leadership, of an engineering concern as too insignificant to matter.

The faulty seal disintegrated 73 seconds into the flight, leading to the immediate catastrophe. It emerged that NASA management had been warned that the seal could fail in the unusually cold temperatures of January 1986. But, given their collective momentum to win, they put pressure on the dissenting engineers who wanted to abort the project. This was, as much as anything, an example of what psychologist Irving Janis defined as "groupthink" in the early 1970s. Janis was looking at the surprisingly common phenomenon of teams who collaborate to form a collective mind–set that compels them to switch off their critical faculties, or their ability to challenge the group on an individual basis. See the last chapter on Followership and the summary of the Nut Island Effect.

It is difficult not to see these forces at work in the herd–like and uncritical extremes of the stock market during the internet boom.

In the case of the Challenger, the subsequent Presidential Commission of 1986 unpacked what emerged as an example of how the best of intentions can become counter productive. The engineers had explained their fears clearly to their managers. But they ran into a wall of disinterest , because the management were so focussed on the NASA objectives &ndash the launch of the space craft. When they tried again, and were rebuffed, they just stopped. "When Arnie realised he wasn″t getting through, he just stopped trying….I also stopped when I couldn″t get anybody to listen."

Management saw the engineer″s silence as compliance with the decision to launch. It was their right to make the decision. Everyone agreed with this hierarchy , and in effect remained loyal to the structure of management rather than challenge it. Instead having said their piece, having been rejected, they remained silent.

Chris Argyris writes in depth about how organisations create and endorse defensive thinking that "make it highly likely individuals, groups, and organisations will not detect or correct the errors that are embarrassing " because we collaborate to endorse unwritten but clear social/political rules of behaviour" . These encourage us away from confronting truth because it may be hurtful, jeopardise "team mores", or just set us apart from our pack. Serious issues become "undiscussables".

Source: Overcoming Organisational Defences :Argyris : Prentice Hall 1990

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